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TESTING THE LIMITS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
The Supreme Court has long identified academic freedom as
"a special concern of the First Amendment." 1 Almost all the
cases in which claims of academic freedom have arisen, however,
have involved the first amendment rights of individual teachers.
2
Although at least one Justice has suggested that academic freedom
is an institutional as well as an individual right,3 the Court has not
yet issued such a holding.
A recent case, Princeton University v. Schmid,4 raised the ques-
tion whether private universities enjoy special protection under
the first amendment. Although the Court found it unnecessary to
decide that question in this case,5 the issue remains a significant
one for private universities seeking to challenge governmental
regulation.
Schmid was perhaps not the best vehicle to resolve this issue.
The case concerned the arrest and conviction for trespassing of a
nonstudent who distributed leaflets on Princeton's campus. The
New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that
the state constitution protected an outsider's right to speak on
Princeton's property.6 The court interpreted the state constitution
as a guarantee of free speech rights "not only against governmental
or public bodies, but under some circumstances against private per-
lKeyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957).
2 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (invalidating
New York's teacher loyalty oath); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
(upholding conviction of former professor who refused to answer questions on
Communist Party membership posed by House Committee on Un-American Activ-
ities); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (reversing contempt con-
viction of a professor who refused to answer state inquiry about content of lecture
at state university); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating
loyalty oath required of faculty members at state college).
S See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion
of Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (suggesting that academic
freedom includes the freedom of a university to make its own educational decisions);
see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (opinion of Frank-
furter, J., concurring in the result) (citing a statement of a conference of South
African scholars that emphasized "'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.").
450 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576), dismissing appeal
from State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
5 See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
6 State v. Schmid, 84 NJ. 535, 569,423 A.2d 615, 633 (1980).
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sons as well." 7 The court held that when property has been
opened to public use, as has Princeton's campus s its owner may
not unreasonably regulate the distribution of leaflets or other ex-
pressive activity by strangers.9
At first glance, the case appeared to pit individual free speech
rights against property rights. Princeton, however, considered the
New Jersey decision an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into
a university's educational decisionmaking. 10  Princeton contended
that the first amendment guarantees academic freedom to institu-
tions as well as to individuals. In Princeton's view, this institutional
right of academic freedom includes a university's right to choose
its "educational atmosphere." 11 Maintenance of the desired at-
mosphere, Princeton argued, requires control over the university
campus, 12 which is "devoted to expressive purposes." 13 The deci-
sion to restrict expressive activity on campus is therefore an educa-
tional decision, protected by the first amendment. In short,
Princeton considered property rights in this case "almost incidental"
to first amendment rights.14
A university's assertion of a right to exclude ideas from its
campus in the name of academic freedom may seem paradoxical;
a university is traditionally thought of as the marketplace of ideas,
7Id. at 559, 423 A.2d at 628.
8 Id. at 564-65, 423 A.2d at 631.
9Od. at 567-68, 423 A.2d at 632-33. "[W]hile the case was pending on appeal [to
the New Jersey Supreme Court], the University substantially amended its regulations
governing solicitation, distribution of literature, and similar activities on University
property by those not affiliated with the University." 50 U.S.L.W. at 4160. The
U.S. Supreme Court, therefore, labeled the validity of the old regulation a moot
issue. Id. It dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that Princeton
lacked standing and noting that "the presence of the State of New Jersey in [the]
case [did] not provide a sound jurisdictional basis for undertaking to decide difficult
constitutional issues." Id.
The Court did not discuss the issue of state action. State action sufficient to
raise a constitutional claim, however, may not have occurred. The state action that
Princeton challenged was actually state inaction: the state's refusal to enforce its
trespass laws. See Brief of Appellee Chris Schmid at 15-18, Princeton Univ. v.
Schmid, 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576) [hereinafter cited
as Schmid Brief].
10 See Brief of Appellant Princeton University at 6-8, Princeton Univ. v. Schmid,
50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576) [hereinafter cited as Prince-
ton Brief]; Prepared text for argument in the Supreme Court of New Jersey by
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach on behalf of The Trustees of Princeton University (Inter-
venor) in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), at 5 [hereinafter cited
as Prepared Text].
11 Princeton Brief, supra note 9, at 11.
12 Id. 13.
13 id. 6.
14 Prepared Text, supra note 10, at 5.
1982]
714 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
open to all. This apparent contradiction, however, should not
cloud the underlying issues. Princeton's contention that academic
freedom extends to institutions as well as to individuals is far
from frivolous. After a brief review of Schmid in part I, this
Comment in part II argues that the core educational functions of
universities should indeed enjoy special protection under the first
amendment.
Princeton's argument faltered, however, in its linkage of
academic freedom to the facts of Schmid. Part III contends that
the first amendment protection Princeton claimed does not ex-
tend to the university's decision to restrict arbitrarily the distribu-
tion of leaflets on its campus. Nevertheless, part III concludes
that the New Jersey decision was incorrect because of its unneces-
sary reliance on the content of the university's educational phi-
losophy. 15
Leaving aside the problem of content neutrality, part IV sug-
gests that other constitutional arguments support Princeton's posi-
tion. Part IV concludes, however, that under a recent Supreme
Court decision, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 6 these
arguments are not sufficient to prevent the state from regulating
expressive activity on university property. Finally, part V suggests
that although the states are not constitutionally required to treat
university campuses differently from shopping centers, certain
policy considerations may incline them to do so.
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND FEDERAL RIGHTS
On April 5, 1978, Chris Schmid, a member of the United
States Labor Party (U.S.L.P.), was distributing and selling political
materials on the campus of Princeton University.17 Neither Schmid
15 84 N.J. at 564-65, 423 A.2d at 631; cf. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.").
16 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
17 84 N.J. at 538, 423 A.2d at 616. Schmid's materials dealt with the candidacy
of a U.S.L.P. member in the Newark mayoral campaign and described the U.S.L.P.
in general. Jurisdictional Statement at 49a, Princeton University v. Schmid, 50
U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdic-
tional Statement].
For background on the U.S.L.P., see Donner & Rothenberg, The Strange
Odyssey of Lyndon LaRouche, 231 TBE NATION 142 (1980); Foster, Teamster Mad-
ness, MoTaHE JONES, Jan. 1982, at 28; N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
These articles describe the U.S.L.P. as a cult-like political organization created and
led by Lyndon LaRouche. The organization shifted its philosophy from the extreme
left to the extreme right during the mid-1970's; throughout its history, however, it
has used disruptive tactics. These tactics have included the infiltration and harass-
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nor the U.S.L.P. was affiliated with the university. Although
Princeton had issued a "blanket invitation" to the public to walk
through its campus, it had established more restrictive rules con-
cerning solicitation and distribution of materials.18 The university
required individuals and groups not affiliated with it to obtain its
permission to engage in such activities.19 The university's policy
was to deny such permission unless the person or group had been
invited by a member of the university community.
20
Although Schmid was aware of this rule, he neither sought
nor received permission to distribute materials on campus.21 Ac-
cordingly, he was arrested and convicted of trespass.22 At the lower
court level, Schmid claimed a violation of his free speech rights
under both the state and federal constitutions.2 3 Because Prince-
ton is a private university, the primary focus was on whether the
campus was analogous to a "company town" under the doctrine of
Marsh v. Alabama.24  If so, the court could treat the university's
action as state action, and Schmid could assert a first amendment
right to distribute leaflets on campus.25 Both of the lower courts
ment of groups it perceives as its enemies and, on occasion, the use of violence.
Although Schmid's activities at Princeton were nondisruptive, a frequent party tactic
is to invite violence by insulting people who refuse to buy the party's literature. A
former party member told the Times that insults such as "pig" and "Nazi" are
common. "They can get anybody to hit them in a second," he said.
Is Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at 4.
19 Id. These regulations have since been revised. See 84 N.J. at 539 & n.2,
423 A.2d at 617 & n.2; supra note 9.
2o Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at 4.
2184 NJ. at 539, 541, 423 A.2d at 617, 618.
22 Id. at 541, 423 A.2d at 618. Schmid was arrested by a member of the uni-
versity security department. He was fined fifteen dollars plus costs. Id.
23 Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 4. The procedural history of the case is as
follows: Schmid was tried and convicted in Princeton Borough Municipal Court.
State v. Schmid, No. SC53264 (Princeton Borough Mun. Ct. Oct. 30, 1978), re-
printed in Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at 49a. A trial de novo by the
New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, also resulted in conviction. Order Ad-
judging Defendant Guilty, reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at
48a. Schmid appealed to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. While
the case was pending there, it was certified by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
then overturned Schmid's conviction. Princeton's petition for rehearing was denied
without opinion, and the university appealed to the Supreme Court. Princeton Brief,
supra note 10, at 4-5.
24326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) ("Whether a corporation or a municipality owns
or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the
functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication
remain free."). See State v. Schmid, No. SC53264 (Princeton Borough Mun. Ct.
Oct. 30, 1978), reprinted in Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at 49a.
25 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) ("It is, of course, a
commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government, federal or state.").
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concluded that Princeton did not fall within the Marsh doctrine,2
which the Supreme Court has narrowed significantly in recent
years.27  The New Jersey Supreme Court strongly suggested that
the lower courts were right in reaching this conclusion and that
Schmid indeed did not have a first amendment right to distribute
leaflets on Princeton's campus.
28
Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned
Schmid's conviction," relying in part on a recent United States
Supreme Court case, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins.30
PruneYard involved a group of high school students who were
collecting signatures on a petition in a privately owned California
shopping center. The California Supreme Court held that even
if the students had no first amendment right to petition on private
property, they did have such a right under the considerably broader
free speech provisions of the state constitution.3 1 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the state court decision.
32
Similarly, in State v. Schmid,33 the New Jersey Supreme Court
26 See Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 17, at 48a, 68a.
27Id. 61a-68a. In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 316-20, 324-25 (1968), the Court appeared to extend the
"company town" rationale to a privately owned shopping center. In Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562-67 (1972), however, the Court held that people who
distribute leaflets have a first amendment right to enter a privately owned shopping
center only when the subject matter of the leaflets is related to the activities of the
center and when no adequate alternative means of communication exist. Finally,
in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), the Court overruled Logan Valley, stat-
ing that "the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the
Lloyd case." Id. 518 (footnote omitted). It now appears that the "company town"
doctrine is limited to the relatively rare situation in which private property "has
taken on all the attributes of a town .... ." Logan Valley, 391 U. S. at 332
(Black, J., dissenting); see Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518-19.
28 See Schmid, 84 N.J. at 549-53, 423 A.2d at 622-24. Compare id. at 575-80,
423 A.2d at 637-39 (Schreiber, J., concurring) (unequivocally rejecting the idea
that Princeton's action could be deemed state action) with id. at 546 n.5, 423 A.2d
at 621 n.5 (majority opinion) (suggesting that a finding of state action might be
reached more easily in a case such as Schmid, which involved the university's
dealings with outsiders, than in a case involving the university's internal affairs).
29 Id. at 569, 423 A.2d at 633.
30447 U.S. 74 (1980); see Schmid, 84 N.J. at 553, 423 A.2d at 624. Prune-
Yard was decided between the time Schmid was argued and the date the New
Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision.
31 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-11, 592 P.2d
341, 346-48, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-61 (1979). See also Alderwood Associates
v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 109 (1981)
(finding, under state constitution, a right for individuals to solicit signatures at a
privately owned shopping mall).
32 PruneYard 447 U.S. at 88.
3384 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton
Univ. v. Schmid, 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576).
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found it unnecessary to rely on the first amendment. It looked
instead to the free speech provisions of the New Jersey Constitu-
tion.3 4 Like those of the California Constitution, the free speech
guarantees of the New Jersey Constitution have no state action
requirement.s They may therefore be interpreted as applying to
private parties as well as to the state. In Schmid, the New Jersey
court devised a three-part test to determine when state-guaranteed
free speech rights are enforceable on private property.36 Applying
the test to Princeton, the court held that those rights were en-
forceable on the university's property.37 Thus, even if Schmid had
no first amendment right to distribute leaflets on Princeton's
campus, the court held that he did have a state constitutional right
to do so, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.38
In light of PruneYard, New Jersey's right to interpret its own
constitution more broadly than the federal Constitution is not in
doubt. Indeed, those who perceive a retrenchment in the area of
civil liberties by the Supreme Court's majority have long ap-
plauded the trend toward relying on state constitutions to afford
greater protection for civil liberties.39 The prospect also may ap-
34 "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." N.J. CONST. art. 1,
para. 6.
"The people have the right freely to assemble together, to consult for the
common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and to petition
for redress of grievances." Id. art. 1, para. 18.
35 See 84 N.J. at 559-60, 423 A.2d at 628. Forty-four state constitutions have
no state action requirement in their free speech provisions. Note, Private Abridge-
ment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 179 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Private Abridgment]. It has been suggested that the other six states
could also protect speech on private property, either through legislation, see Cohen,
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins: Past, Present and Future, 57 CQ.-INT
L. Rv. 373, 387 (1981), or through judicial interpretation, see State v. Schmid,
84 N.J. at 557 n.8, 423 A.2d at 626 n.8. The first draft of what became the first
amendment to the United States Constitution did not have a state action require-
ment. See 1 TaE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN Tm CONGrESS OF ThE UN=
STATEs 452, 760 (J. Gales compiler 1834). Omitting a state action requirement,
therefore, is not without precedent.
36 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630. For a detailed discussion of the three-part
test, see infra notes 129-45 and accompanying text.
37 84 N.J. at 563-66, 423 A.2d at 630-31.
38 84 N.J. at 568-69, 423 A.2d at 633. A recent decision, Pennsylvania v. Tate,
432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981), takes a similar approach. In Tate, members of an anti-
war group were arrested for trespassing when they distributed leaflets at a public
symposium on crime prevention at a private college. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overturned their trespass convictions, relying on the state constitution's free
speech guarantees. 432 A.2d at 1390-91; see PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7. The court,
however, did not mention academic freedom.
39 See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 91 (Marshall, J., concurring); Brennan,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489
(1977); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
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peal to federalists who, while perhaps disagreeing with the sub-
stance of some state court decisions, would support a state's right
to chart its own course.
40
A state, however, cannot expand the state-derived rights of
some individuals by infringing on the federally protected rights of
others.41  In PruneYard, the Supreme Court held that California
had not infringed on the shopping center owner's federally pro-
tected property rights; 42 in Schmid, the New Jersey court seemed
to assume that Princeton's property rights were not substantially
greater than those of the shopping owner.43 PruneYard also held
that California had not infringed on the petitioner's first amend-
ment rights; 44 the New Jersey court did not address Princeton's
first amendment rights at all. Yet on appeal Princeton claimed to
have first amendment rights much greater than those of other
property owners,45 making its asserted institutional right of aca-
demic freedom sufficient to distinguish Schmid from PruneYard
and to justify an opposite result.
48
II. THE SCOPE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A determination that institutions may claim a right of academic
freedom requires an understanding of the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of that right as it applies to individuals.47 For the most part,
the cases addressing the academic freedom issue have involved the
Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for
State Bills of Rights, 8 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. 1B-V. 271 (1973); Private Abridgment,
supra note 35.
4 0 See, e.g., PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81 (majority opinion by justice Rehnquist).
41 See id.
42 Id. 82-85. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53.
43 84 N.J. at 560-62, 423 A.2d at 628-30.
44 447 U.S. at 85-88. But see id. 96-101 (Powell, J., joined by White, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment, expressing reservations on first amendment
holding).
45 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, passim.
46 Id. 22-25.
4 7 "[Dlespite occasional references to institutional autonomy, academic freedom
doctrine has so far concerned protection of the rights of individual faculty members
rather than those of institutions." Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation
of University Hiring, 92 Hnv. L. REv. 879, 881 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Academic Freedom]. One author has defined academic freedom as "a right claimed
by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings
and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference,
molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some
constituted authority within or beyond the institution." R. MAcIVER, AcADEMac
FREE DOm Ix OuR Tnsm 6 (1955).
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refusal of teachers at state schools to comply with investigations or
to sign loyalty oaths.48
These cases raise two questions. First, do teachers really enjoy
any more protection than other public employees-that is, is aca-
demic freedom a special first amendment right, or is it simply what
the first amendment is called when used to protect teachers? If it
is the latter, then academic institutions may have no greater first
amendment rights than other institutions, such as corporations or
even shopping centers.49 Second, if a special first amendment right
of academic freedom does indeed exist, what is its justification?
If it attaches to teachers only as individuals, its extension to
institutions may be difficult to justify. If, however, it attaches to
teachers because of their role in society, then academic institutions
should be similarly protected if they fill a similar role.
A. Academic Freedom as a Special First Amendment Right
The first question-whether academic freedom is a special con-
cern of the first amendment-is difficult to answer with certainty.
Most cases in which the Supreme Court has discussed academic
freedom have concerned speech or associational activities that took
place outside the classroomti In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,51
48 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); cf. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485
(1952) (upholding law making membership in subversive groups grounds to termi-
nate teachers and school employees).
Generally, only teachers at state institutions may invoke constitutional protection
for their claims of academic freedom because the first amendment applies only to
state action. Teachers at private institutions may, and often do, claim that the
university administration has violated their rights of academic freedom. Such claims,
however, are not constitutional; instead, they are often based on contractual rights.
Perhaps the most effective sources of such protection at the nonconstitutional level
are the tenure system and professional associations such as the American Association
of University Professors. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Free-
dom, 81 HAzav. L. REv. 1045, 1084-1128 (1968).
49 See First Natl Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) ("If
the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could
silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision-
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual") (footnotes omitted). The shopping center
owner in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980), asserted
his first amendment rights as an individual. Corporations that own shopping centers
presumably would be able to assert first amendment rights as well.
50 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). But see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957) (contempt citation for refusal to answer questions about lecture delivered
to class at state university).
51385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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for example, the Court held that state university professors could
not be dismissed for refusing to comply with an unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad state "anti-subversive" program. It seems
fairly clear that the Court would have reached the same result if
the individuals challenging the program had been state-employed
plumbers, machinists, or cafeteria workers instead of teachers. 2
52 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (invalidating statute pro-
hibiting employment of subversives in defense facilities on grounds of overbreadth);
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating loyalty oath required of
all state employees, including faculty and staff at state universities).
One commentator, writing in the early 1960's, felt that teachers' first amend-
ment rights were being violated to a greater extent than those of other citizens.
Academic freedom is violated, he wrote, when a teacher is punished for extracur-
ricular speech for which other citizens could not constitutionally be punished.
Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 LAw &
CoNTEMT. PROBs. 447, 468-69 (1963).
A teacher's right of free speech within the classroom actually may be more
circumscribed than the on-the-job free speech rights of other public employees.
Courts have shown concern that teachers of young children might Indoctrinate or
proselytize their students. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 624, 628 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (justifying laws directed at
subversives on ground that it is especially important to prevent subversives from
shaping young minds).
Apparently no Supreme Court cases deal directly with a teacher's right of free
speech inside the classroom; a number of lower courts, however, have dealt with
this issue by applying the standard set for students in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of high school students to protest the Vietnam war by wearing
black armbands in school. The Court held that a school cannot penalize students'
exercise of first amendment rights without "a showing that the students' activities
would materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."
Id. 513 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit applied this standard to allow a
teacher to wear a black armband in class for similar reasons. James v. Board of
Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); cf. Russo v.
Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding first amendment
violation when teacher dismissed for standing silently during classroom recitation
of pledge of allegiance), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Hanover v. Northrup,
325 F. Supp. 170 (D. Conn. 1970) (similar case).
Even when there is no "disruption" according to the Tinker standard, however,
some courts have rejected teachers' first amendment claims. See East Hartford
Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane) (rejecting
teacher's claim that his refusal to wear a tie in his English class constituted "sym-
bolic speech"); Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974) (uphold-
ing termination of teachers for distrib uting poem to eighth grade students extolling
marijuana and joyous life style), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Resetar v.
State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 399 A.2d 225 (upholding dismissal of teacher
with history of intemperate conduct for calling his students "jungle bunnies"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 (1979).
Most of these cases, however, involved elementary or secondary school teachers.
Teachers at state colleges or universities are likely to have more freedom in their
choice of curriculum and teaching method. In Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802
(E.D. Ark. 1979), an assistant professor at a state university claimed he was not
rehired because of his Marxist beliefs. The court concluded that "at least in the
context of a university classroom, Cooper had a constitutionally protected right
simply to inform his students of his personal political and philosophical views."
Id. 811 (footnote omitted). The court noted that it was expressing no view
"whether the same expression by a teacher in a public grade school or high school
classroom would also be constitutionally protected." Id. 811 n.5. But see Olman
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Yet it is difficult to dismiss the Court's "academic freedom"
language as mere rhetoric. Perhaps the first amendment rights at
issue in these cases would have been vindicated had the individuals
involved been plumbers, but members of the Court clearly have
been particularly vehement in vindicating the rights of teachers.
Justice Douglas's dissent in Adler v. Board of Education,5 3 in which
the majority upheld a state loyalty program applied to teachers,
is the first 54 and one of the most powerful examples of such
vehemence:
What happens under this law is typical of what hap-
pens in a police state. Teachers are under constant sur-
veillance; their pasts are combed for signs of disloyalty;
their utterances are watched for clues to dangerous
thoughts. A pall is cast over the classrooms. There can
be no real academic freedom in that environment.55
Later the same year, Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opin-
ion in Wieman v. Updegraff,55 echoed Justice Douglas's concern
for academic freedom: "To regard teachers . . . as the priests
of our democracy is . . . not to indulge in hyperbole." 57 By the
time Sweezy v. New Hampshire5 8 was decided five years later,
several members of the Supreme Court seemed ready to acknowl-
edge academic freedom as a constitutional right, declaring:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident. . . . To im-
pose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our
Nation. . . . Teachers and students must always remain
free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new ma-
turity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die.59
v. Toll, 518 F. Supp. 1196, 1218, 1220 (D. Md. 1981) (rejecting Marxist professor's
claim that state university president refused to appoint him department chairman
because of his beliefs, holding that professor's beliefs, while protected, were not
"motivating factors" in decision and noting that one outside evaluator said plaintiff
would seek to "indoctrinate" students if he were hired).
53 342 U.S. at 508-11 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
5 4 See Note, Academic Freedom-Its Constitutional Context, 40 U. CoLo. L.
Rrv. 600, 609 (1968) (noting this dissent as the first specific recognition by a
Supreme Court Justice of the concept of academic freedom).
55 342 U.S. at 510.
56 344 U.S. at 194-98 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring).
57 1& 196.
58354 U.S. 234 (1957).
59 Id. 250 (Chief Justice Warren announcing the judgment of the Court in an
opinion joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan).
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Finally, in Keyishian, the Supreme Court stated that academic
freedom is "a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." 60
Thus, from Adler to Keyishian, the Court has come not only
to recognize academic freedom as a constitutional right, but also to
endorse a kind of heightened judicial vigilance over alleged in-
fringements.
B. The Teacher's Role in Society
The Court's concern in the academic freedom cases appears
to be that state laws and investigations would affect freedom of
speech inside, as well as outside, the classroom. The Court's lan-
guage indicates an apprehension that such infringement would
have a chilling effect, not only on the speech of individual teachers,
but also on the entire educational process.61 Thus in Keyishian,
the Court stated that "[o]ur nation is deeply committed to safe-
guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all
of us and not merely to the teachers concerned." 62 As one com-
mentator has persuasively argued, the extra "weight" in the balance
in the academic freedom cases is not the teacher's personal freedom,
but society's interest in a lack of restriction of teaching.63 The
Court, therefore, has seen fit to give added protection to the speech
of teachers because of their role in society as innovators, ques-
tioners, experimenters, and gadflies.
C. Academic Freedom as an Institutional Right
As has been noted,64 the Supreme Court has not squarely held
that the first amendment's protection of academic freedom extends
to the autonomy of educational institutions as well as to the free
speech rights of individual teachers. 65 Nonetheless, the Court's
60 385 U.S. at 603.
61 A tension remains, however, between the vigilant judicial protection of out-
of-class speech and the much more limited protection accorded in-class speech.
See supra note 52.
62385 U.S. at 603 (emphasis added).
63 See Note, supra note 54, at 608-11.
64 See supra note 47.
65 Private schools as institutions did receive some protection against state inter-
ference in a series of cases that reached the Supreme Court in the 1920's. These
cases were decided, however, on due process rather than first amendment grounds.
See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (extensive governmental
regulation of private foreign language schools held to deny owners and patrons
"reasonable choice and discretion in respect of teachers, curriculum and text-
books"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533-36 (1925) (state law re-
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development of the doctrine of academic freedom in the individual
context indicates that it logically could be extended to protect
institutions. Such an extension could be justified on either of
two grounds, both of which are based on the notion that teachers
receive special protection because of the role they fill in society.6
This Comment contends that either of these proposed concepts of
institutional academic freedom would protect a university's right
to exclude state-imposed ideas from the core aspects of its educa-
tional functions-primarily its classes and curriculum.
1. The University's Vicarious Assertion of Individual
First Amendment Rights
The first of these concepts of academic freedom is perhaps the
more limited one. It is suggested in part by Justice Powell's opin-
ion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,67 in a
passage that Princeton and others have interpreted as the first hint
of Supreme Court support for an institutional right of academic
freedom.68 Bakke involved a medical school admissions plan that
set aside a certain number of places for minority applicants. Jus-
tice Powell, speaking for himself alone, found that a race-conscious
admissions plan could be justified by the university's goal of attain-
ing a diverse student body, which he found to be a "compelling"
interest.69 "Academic freedom," he wrote, "long has been viewed
as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a
university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body." 70
Although seemingly quite open-ended,71 when placed in con-
quiring all children to attend public school unreasonably interferes with liberty of
parents); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (law forbidding teaching
of any modem foreign language is an intrusion into liberty of parents and teachers).
6 6 See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
67438 U.S. 265, 269-320 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
6 8 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 7; Comment, Preventing Unnecessary
Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69
CAIXF. L. REv. 1538, 1546, 1547-48 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Privilege];
Academic Freedom, supra note 47, at 882-85.
69 438 U.S. at 314. Justice Powell's identification of diversity as a compelling
interest in the university context appears in Part IV.D. of his opinion, a part in
which no other Justice joined. Four other Justices found the admissions program
justified by the university's goal of remedying discrimination in society as a whole.
Id. 362 (Breunan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun).
70 I& 312.
7 1 Even more open-ended is the following passage from Justice Frankfurters
concurring opinion in Sweezy, which Justice Powell cited with approval:
19821]
724 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
text Justice Powell's concept of academic freedom appears consid-
erably more circumscribed. First, Bakke involved a state univer-
sity. It is difficult to see how an arm of the state can assert any
first amendment rights of its own. Certainly it could not espouse
a particular religious, ideological, or political viewpoint without
violating the first amendment.72  Nor could it exercise its right
to select its student body in order to exclude rather than include
minority students.7"
Perhaps Justice Powell actually was concerned with the first
amendment rights of the students-specifically, their rights to asso-
ciate freely with minority students. 74 Justice Powell may have
seen the state university as asserting vicariously, these aggregate
individual first amendment rights. If so, his concept of an institu-
tional right of academic freedom would protect the institution,
whether private or public, only to the extent that it furthered
these individual rights.75 In addition, Justice Powell's discussion
of the institutional right-and that he discussed it in the context
of a state university-suggests a second limitation: only those institu-
tional policies promoting "diversity" and a "robust exchange of
ideas" are to be protected by the first amendment.76 In short,
students and teachers are protected because of their roles in so-
ciety, and universities are to be protected to the extent that they
enable students and teachers to fulfill these individual roles.
77
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmos-
phere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
438 U.S. at 312. Justice Frankfurter was quoting the words of a group of South
African scholars who were protesting racially exclusionary policies that their govern-
ment had imposed. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263.
72 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 9; Academic Freedom, supra note 47,
at 883.
7zSee, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Even private
schools may be barred from refusing to admit black students. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-75 (1976). Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973) (states may not constitutionally provide free textbooks to segregated private
schools).
74Freedom of association has been termed a limited or peripheral first amend-
ment right, applying only to the pursuit of goals "independently protected by the
first amendment." L. TamE, AmEwrcAN CoNsTrr=TONA.L LAw, § 12-23, at 702
(1978) (emphasis in original). Thus, students who want to attend segregated
schools might not have a freedom of association claim because racial segregation is
not a protected purpose.
75 Academic Freedom, supra note 47, at 883.
70 Id. 883-85.
77Justice Powell appeared to extend his view of institutional academic freedom
in his dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730,
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2. A University's Philosophy as a Form of Communication
Although Justice Powell in Bakke appeared to endorse a broad
right of academic freedom, 78 Princeton acknowledged the limita-
tions of this right as exercised by public educational institutions.7 9
It argued, however, that private universities have much broader
first amendment rights than public universities: "What at first
blush is difficult to understand is simply that the educational policy
choices guaranteed to private universities by the First Amendment
are denied to public ones for the same First Amendment reasons." so
Although public universities cannot align themselves with par-
ticular philosophies, Princeton contended that in the private set-
ting it is the very choice of such a philosophy that the first
amendment protects. Thus, Princeton's argument suggests a sec-
ond concept of academic freedom: that the effective owners of a
university-its trustees and administrators-express their philoso-
phies through their institutions.81 Such expression, Princeton
argued, is protected by the first amendment. 82 This concept of
academic freedom harks back to the protection of the teacher's
role in society, but it rests on the notion that the university's role
as an institution is similar to the teacher's role as an individual.
If this similarity in roles exists, institutions should enjoy as much
independent first amendment protection as individuals.
In support of its argument, Princeton relied heavily on Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,83 drawing an implicit analogy
between universities and newspapers as two institutions protected
by the first amendment.84 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck
747 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from Court's finding of private right of action
under title IX on grounds statute "trenches on the authority of the academic com-
munity to govern itself'). Cf. Lacovara, How Far Can the Federal Camel Slip
Under the Academic Tent?, 4 J.C. & U.L. 223, 232 (1977) (arguing that academic
freedom should extend to institutions because the unfettered development of ideas
by students and teachers cannot take place in a vacuum).
7 8 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
79 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 9.
80 Id. (emphasis in original).
81 Cf. W.F. BUCKL.Y, COD AND MAN AT YALE 190 (1951) ("[In the last
analysis, academic freedom must mean the freedom of men and women to supervise
the educational activities and aims of the schools they oversee and support.").
82 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 11.
83418 U.S. 241 (1974).
84 See Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 7, 23-25. Because the press is spe-
cifically mentioned in the first amendment, it arguably may be entitled to greater
protection than other institutions. But see First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) (Burger, CJ., concurring) for a rejection of this
possibility: "The liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although complementary
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down a Florida statute mandating a "right of reply" for political
candidates who had been criticized by a newspaper; the law re-
quired the paper to publish the candidate's reply free of charge.
As in Princeton University v. Schmid,85 the justification for a
state-mandated right of access was that individuals need access to
forums in which they can exercise their free speech rights.8 6  The
Court declared, however, that the Florida law exacted "a penalty
on the basis of the content of a newspaper" 87 and was an "intrusion
into the function of editors"; 88 it concluded:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit
for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of ma-
terial to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as
to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether
fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control
and judgment8s
If the analogy makes sense and a private university is similarly
"more than a passive . . . conduit for" the exchange of ideas be-
tween its students and faculty, then its educational decisions should
be protected just as a newspaper's editorial decisions are.90 In
to and a natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited special mention simply
because it had been more often the object of official restraints." Id. 800.
Even if one assumes that the press does merit more first amendment protection
than other institutions, Tornillo need not necessarily be limited to protecting the
rights of newspapers. Once universities are brought within the constitutional
doctrine of academic freedom, Tornillo also should be applicable to them. The
academic freedom doctrine would confer an additional measure of first amendment
protection on universities and thus elevate their constitutional status to that of
newspapers.
85 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576), dismissing appeal
from State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
86 See 418 U.S. at 251-52.
87Id. 256.
88 Id. 258.
89Id. (footnote omitted).
90 A number of commentators have remarked on the apparent inconsistency
between Tornillo and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
Red Lion upheld the FCC's "fairness doctrine," which mandates a right of reply
for an individual who has been the object of a personal attack over a broadcast
station. The Court rejected the broadcasters' first amendment claims.
A review of the extensive literature attempting to reconcile Red Lion and
Tornillo is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Van Alstyne, The Mdbius Strip
of the First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REv. 539, 547 n.49
(1978) (listing articles). Van Alstyne suggests that broadcast media and news-
papers are distinguishable because of the scarcity of usable broadcast frequencies.
Through licensing, the government assigns these frequencies in exchange for the
fiduciary duty of airing some programs on public issues. Id. 550-52. Van Alstyne
notes that most of the commentators "supportive of Red Lion agree . . . that the
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fact, the analogy does appear to hold true. Although many deci-
sions a university makes are bound to be mundane and primarily
administrative, basic decisions affecting teaching and curriculum
may well reflect the institution's underlying educational philosophy.
In deciding which courses to offer, which teachers to hire,91 even,
perhaps, which extracurricular activities to support, a university's
trustees and administrators are selecting certain options and reject-
ing others in accordance with some notion, whether implicit or
explicit, of what is worthy of study and serious thought.
The analogy between universities and individual teachers in-
volves similar considerations. Although universities are not
typically perceived as innovators or gadflies-as individual teachers
might be-they can and do perform these roles in their own way:
An innovative school such as Antioch College can be as creative,92
in an institutional sense, as a scholar who formulates a new theory.
Similarly, a university's decision to offer a course in Marxian eco-
nomics in the midst of a hostile political climate should be just as
worthy of protection as a professor's refusal to cooperate with a
state investigation into vaguely defined "subversives." P3
Thus, returning to the Tornillo analogy, a private university's
decision to offer a course in Marxian economics, like an editor's de-
cision to publish an article criticizing a politician, is a decision
protected by the first amendment. A state law mandating, for
example, a "right of reply" for monetarists criticized in the uni-
versity's Marxian economics course would be an intrusion similar
to that declared unconstitutional in Tornillo. A law requiring
that a specific course be introduced into the curriculum might even
rise to the level of "compelled speech," which also has been held
to violate the first amendment.94
It appears, then, that if Princeton's concept of institutional
academic freedom-a university's educational philosophy as pro-
literal scarcity distinction is both necessary and sufficient to sustain the case along-
side Tornillo." Id. 552 (footnote omitted). This peculiar characteristic of broad-
cast stations appears sufficient to distinguish them not only from newspapers but
also from universities.
91Cf. Proposed Privilege, supra note 68, at 1546-52 (compelled disclosure of
university's confidential employment information implicates its rights of academic
freedom); Academic Freedom, supra note 47, at 888-91 (university's hiring decisions
are a form of protected speech).
92 See generally ANTOCH COLLEGE, MumYsw (1977-79) 5, 12-15 (describing
college's innovative programs).
93 Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (professor's refusal to
answer questions about his lectures protected by the first amendment).
94 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(pledge of allegiance requirement violates first amendment).
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tected "communication"-is accepted, a university has a first amend-
ment right to resist the state's imposition of ideas it does not choose
to support. Under Tornillo, this is true regardless whether the
state itself has dictated the content of the idea; an imposed "right
of access" for outsiders' ideas would be just as unconstitutional as
a state-mandated course.
If, alternatively, Justice Powell's view of institutional academic
freedom is accepted, a private university's right to exclude ideas
becomes somewhat more difficult, but not impossible, to justify.
One of the two limitations suggested by Justice Powell's opinion
is that the first amendment protects only those institutional policies
that promote diversity.9 5 If this is read to mean diversity within
the individual school, then clearly the exclusion of ideas would not
merit protection. If, however, the word is read more broadly to
mean diversity within society as a whole, an individual institution's
decision to exclude ideas might well qualify as a protected one.
The right to exclude or reject ideas is an essential part of the right
to be different, whether in the institutional or individual context. 6
Thus, requiring each institution to accept a broad range of ideas,
in the interest of internal diversity, may well lead to a decline in
diversity among institutions.9 7  Such a decline in diversity over
the past twenty years has in fact been documented; it has been
attributed largely to the growth of publicly supported universities
and the decline of smaller and more specialized private colleges.98
The creation of an enclave devoted to a specific ideology-a "school
of thought" in a literal sense-may contribute to the "robustness"
of the exchange of ideas between, if not within, institutions.99
An institution's right to exclude ideas also may survive another
limitation inferable from Justice Powell's discussion: the re-
quirement that a university be asserting vicariously the individual
rights of its students and faculty in order to claim an institutional
right of academic freedom. 100 If a single institution's exclusion
95 See supra text accompanying notes 69 & 76.
9 6 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (upholding refusal to
display state motto on license plate); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640-42 (school cannot
compel "uniformity of sentiment").
97 Cf. C. PACE, ThE DEMISE oF Drvmissry? 2 (1974) ("As each institution
expands the range of its own programs, it may increase the diversity of its own
clientele but at the same time decrease the difference between it and other insti-
tutions").
98 Id. 3.
99 Academic Freedom, supra note 47, at 885.
10 0 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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of ideas serves to increase diversity among institutions,'0 ' it follows
that recognition of an institution's right to exclude ideas broadens
the range of educational choice available to individuals. Some
students and teachers choose certain schools-for example, small
liberal arts schools or schools with a certain political outlook-
for the very reason that they limit themselves to a specific range
of ideas or courses. The choice to attend such a school may itself
be seen as an exercise of first amendment freedoms IP2-whether
viewed as "symbolic speech" or as freedom of association-and it
can be exercised effectively only if diversity among institutions is
protected.'"4
Although a basis for an institutional right of academic freedom
therefore may be discerned, the scope of this right is not clear. A
university should not be able to immunize any action it takes simply
by invoking the words "academic freedom." This Comment does
not contend that Princeton, or any other private institution, could
claim a first amendment right either to exclude minorities from its
student body' °4 or to engage in discriminatory faculty hiring
practices. 0 5 Princeton, however, claimed a right to exclude ideas,
101 See supra note 97 and text accompanying note 99.
102 The right to choose which school to attend also may be considered part of
the guarantee of "liberty" in the due process clause. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Supreme Court ruled that a state law requiring parents
to send their children to public school "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents... to direct the upbringing and education of [their] children." Id. 534-35.
The Court added that a state lacks any general power "to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only." Id. 535.
103 At least one important difference between the Powell approach to academic
freedom and Princeton's view of it remains. Under the Powell approach, a uni-
versity could not assert a right of academic freedom against its own members,
because its right is derived from theirs. Thus, if a rule like Princeton's were applied
by a state university against its students and faculty, the university could not defend
the rule on first amendment "academic freedom" grounds. Rather, the students
and faculty could attack the rule on first amendment grounds because their own
rights of free speech would be violated.
104 Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (private schools may not
exclude black students). See generally H. FriENDLY, THE DaimrouT- CoLLEG.E
CAsE im m PuBLIC-PwVATE PENmBmRA 11 (n.d.) (assuming that the states
constitutionally may prohibit religious as well as racial discrimination in private
universities).
105 Claims of employment discrimination against universities are notoriously diffi-
cult to win. University employment and tenure decisions are largely subjective,
presenting the plaintiff with difficult issues of proof under title VII. Courts are wary
of second-guessing decisions made on academic grounds. See, e.g., Faro v. New
York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. University of Pitts-
burgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328, 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Lewis v. Chicago State College,
299 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (N.D. Ill. 1969). More recently, the Second Circuit has
lamented that its Faro opinion is widely cited "for the broad proposition that courts
should exercise minimal scrutiny of college and university employment practices.
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not people. 0 6  In practice, courts and legislatures have refrained
-with a few notorious exceptions 10 7-from intervening in internal
curriculum decisions, even where public institutions are con-
... This anti-interventionist policy has rendered colleges and universities virtually
immune to charges of employment bias, at least when that bias is not expressed
overtly." Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 984 (1978). See also Note, Tenure and Partnership as Title VII Remedies,
94 HARv. L. REv. 457, 475 (1980); Comment, Subjective Employment Criteria and
the Future of Title VII in Professional Jobs, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 165, 213 (1976)
("Given the restrictions imposed by courts in university cases, only the most qualified
plaintiffs who are judged by the most blatantly biased evaluators could hope to
succeed.").
Allowing the introduction of an academic freedom defense in employment
discrimination actions would place yet another obstacle in the plaintiff's path and
lend itself to misuse by the defendant. One state university, for example, argued
that its denial of tenure to a woman professor was based not on sex discrimination
but on its belief that the plaintiff's academic interest in women's issues was too
"trendy." Lynn v. Regents, University of California, 21 Fair Emp. Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 313, 314 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The district court found this argument con-
vincing, implying that it showed that the university's tenure decision was protected
by "academic freedom." Id. 315. The court of appeals, however, reversed, finding
that the university's "disdain for women's issues, and . .. diminished opinion of
those who concentrate on those issues, is evidence of a discriminatory attitude
towards women." (footnote omitted). Lynn v. Regents of the University of
California, 656 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426
(5th Cir. 1981) (in employment discrimination case, "academic freedom" does not
protect faculty member against discovery of his vote on tenure for plaintiff); Kunda
v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547, 549 (3d Cir. 1980) (rejecting college's
claim that trial court's award of conditional tenure in sex discrimination suit violated
college's academic freedom). But see Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 92
F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (confidentiality of faculty peer review system protected
against discovery in employment discrimination suit; decision on granting tenure
embodies essence of academic freedom).
See generally Lacovara, supra note 77, at 225-26, 230, 233-35; Oaks, A Private
University Looks at Government Regulation, 4 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3-4 (1976); Proposed
Privilege, supra note 68, at 1548-55; Academic Freedom, supra note 47, at 888-90.
106 One might argue that in fact Princeton is excluding people rather than
ideas because its rule applies only to outsiders. If a student or faculty member
were to engage in expressive activity on Princeton's campus, however, the university
presumably would apply its own internal disciplinary sanctions. Only when a
stranger-who is immune to Princeton's internal sanctions-undertakes the ex-
pressive activity do the state's trespass laws necessarily become involved. In addi-
tion, the university rules in effect at the time of Schmid's arrest merely required an
invitation from a student or a faculty member as a prerequisite to allowing ex-
pressive activity by strangers. Thus, Princeton's apparent objective was not to
exclude certain people but certain ideas-that is, those ideas that members of the
university community had no interest in hearing.
107 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (law forbidding teach-
ing of evolution in state schools violates first amendment's establishment clause);
see also Kay v. Board of Higher Educ., 173 Misc. 943, 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct.),
aff'd mer., 259 A.D. 879, 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1940). In Kay, a taxpayer challenged
Bertrand Russell's appointment as Professor of Philosophy at the City College of
New York. The court upheld the challenge, relying in part on Russell's lack of
good "moral character," as evidenced by his views on sex. Id. at 948-49, 18
N.Y.S.2d at 827. In a statement clearly illustrating the dangers of judicial inter-
vention in this area, the court said, "[alcademic freedom does not mean academic
license. It is the freedom to do good and not to teach evil." Id. at 951, 18
N.Y.S.2d at 829.
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cerned. 08 Such restraint indicates respect for the autonomy of
educational institutions.
D. Summary
"Academic freedom" is more than merely a label for the first
amendment as applied to teachers. It attaches to teachers because
of their role in society and gives them heightened protection. One
argument favoring an institutional right of academic freedom is
that a university is asserting vicariously the individual rights of its
teachers and students. This institutional right, however, is limited:
it must be exercised in the interests of promoting diversity and a
robust exchange of ideas.
A second argument favoring such an institutional right is that
a university's choice of educational philosophy is a form of com-
munication; thus, first amendment protections extend to it.
Analogizing its educational decisions to a newspaper's editorial
decisions, Princeton argued that a state-mandated right of access
to its campus is unconstitutional.""
Princeton's decision to exclude unwanted ideas may be justi-
fied under either concept of institutional academic freedom. The
limits on this institutional right of academic freedom, however,
remain to be explored.
III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
In its broadest sense, education is not only the communication
of ideas, but also the creation of an environment.
Teaching and exchange of ideas occur not only in the
classroom but on the walkways and grounds of the campus,
where students speak to students, professors with profes-
sors, and professors with students. In what manner and to
what extent persons who are not members of the Univer-
sity community may contribute to this educational process
are educational decisions." 0
108 See Proposed Privilege, supra note 68, at 1547; Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 Hcav. L. REv. 1045, 1050-55 (1968). In Epperson, the
Supreme Court said:
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of
the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint ... Courts do not
and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values.
393 U.S. at 104 (footnote omitted).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
110 Princeton Brief, supra note 10, at 13.
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Decisions concerning the ideas that may be expressed on a campus
may have some effect on a university's educational environment.
Whether such decisions are so central to education that they merit
first amendment protection, however, is another question.
The New Jersey Supreme Court based its State v. Schmid"'
decision on the state constitution's free speech provision, which
has no state action requirement, 112 and not on the first amendment,
which does. 18 The decision is therefore unlikely to impinge on
the university's curriculum decisions or its dealings with students
and faculty. If the court had found state action in Schmid, the
university might have been required to remain ideologically neu-
tral and to comport with the requirements of due process in its
dealings with students and possibly with tenured faculty.114
The Schmid opinion, however, is confined to the university's re-
lationship to outsiders, and only to those areas of the university's
property where the public has been invited.115
Princeton, however, sought to invoke the first amendment to
exclude unwanted ideas from its campus entirely, contending that
its property is "devoted to expressive purposes" and therefore is
protected by the first amendment. 116 In two previous cases, the Su-
preme Court has struck down laws requiring property to be used
11184 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. Princeton
Univ. v. Schmid, 50 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576).
112 Id. at 553, 560, 423 A.2d at 624, 628. See supra notes 34-35 and text ac-
companying note 35.
113 Even before the Supreme Court began narrowing the state action concept,
see supra note 27, courts were reluctant to apply it to private universities, largely
because of the difficulties of limiting the consequences of such a finding. Compare
Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (D.D.C. 1967) (refusing to find
state action by a private university merely on the basis of partial federal funding
because of difficulties of limiting consequences of such a finding) with Guillory v.
Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962) (opinion of
Skelly Wright, J.) (dictum) (suggesting that schools and colleges, whether public
or private, come within reach of fourteenth amendment because they perform a
public function).
At least one commentator has urged that private universities should be subject
to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment because they, like company towns
and unlike shopping centers, have the power to infringe not only first amendment
rights but also those rights guaranteed by other constitutional provisions. See
Schubert, State Action and the Private University, 24 RuTcGERs L. REv. 323, 327-30
(1970).
114 See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school students threatened
with brief disciplinary expulsions have right to informal hearing). See generally 1
N. DosEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, PoLrTCAL ANm CrvI EiGrrs iN 7 UNMD
STAimS 862-69 (4th ed. 1976).
115 See Schmid, 84 N.J. at 546 n.5, 423 A.2d at 621 n.5 (suggesting a "less
rigorous standard" for state action when a private university's dealings with out-
siders, rather than its internal affairs, are at issue).
"1
6See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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for an "expressive purpose" with which its owner did not agree. In
Wooley v. Maynard,"7 the Court struck down a New Hampshire
law requiring the slogan "Live Free or Die" to be displayed on
state license plates. The Court held that the state may not "con-
stitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemina-
tion of an ideological message by displaying it on his private prop-
erty in a manner and for the express purpose that it may be
observed and r~aa by the public." 118 In Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo,"9 the Court struck down a Florida law requiring
newspapers to publish rebuttal to personal attacks as an infringe-
ment on first amendment rights, even though the state did not
mandate a specific message. Property rights in both cases were
only incidental to first amendment rights.
The property involved in Wooley and Tornillo differs in one
crucial respect from the university campus involved in Schmid.
License plates and newspapers are tangible items that, partly be-
cause they have words printed on them, actually communicate a
message; a university's campus is merely the setting in which
communication takes place. Although a university may use its
property for expressive purposes, it cannot be said to be "speaking
through" its property. "Free speech" has been defined to include
many different methods of communication, but the common char-
acteristic of these methods is that they all involve some kind bf
activity.120  The mere ownership of property that is not itself used
to communicate ideas strains the definition of "activity." 121
117430 U.S. 705 (1977).
118 Id. 713.
119 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
120 See generally Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court,
68 CAruF. L. B1c. 422, 431-32 (1980) (various definitions of conduct protected by
the first amendment).
121 Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented in Wooley on the ground that
the required display of a license plate is not an affirmative expressive act. 430
U.S. at 720-21. The majority conceded that, compared to the pledge of allegiance
requirement struck down in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943), the display of a license plate is a "passive act." Nonetheless, the
Court concluded that
the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as in Barnette, we are
faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his
daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to
be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of
view he finds unacceptable.
430 U.S. at 715.
Princeton's claim might be viewed as an assertion that its property management
is protected by the first amendment-arguably a more active endeavor than property
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The ownership of property is often an essential prerequisite
to the exercise of civil liberties,122 and the dichotomy between per-
sonal rights and property rights has been declared a false one.
1 23
Nonetheless, property does not automatically become imbued with
its owner's constitutional rights. A university might argue per-
suasively for preventing strangers from expressing ideas in its class-
rooms, but not because its desks and chairs are protected by the
first amendment. Rather, such exclusion is justifiable because class-
rooms are not generally open to the public. Expressive activity in
the classroom by strangers would interfere with the university's
communication of its own message.
If a university's communication merits first amendment pro-
tection, perhaps its right of academic freedom should extend only
so far as is necessary to prevent interference with that communica-
tion.124 Expressitve activity by strangers on a private university
campus, subject to suitable time, place, and manner restrictions,125
should no more interfere with this communication than it does on
a public campus, although the content of the private university's
message may be different. A complete ban on outside speakers
would not be necessary to protect the university's ability to com-
municate. 26  Students' privacy interests and the maintenance of
an atmosphere conducive to study can be protected by prohibiting
ownership. Nevertheless, decisions about property management are too remote
from core educational concerns to be clothed with first amendment protection.
'22 See Van Alstyne, The Recrudescence of Property Rights as the Foremost
Principle of Civil Liberties: The First Decade of the Burger Court, 43 LAw &
CoNTnmp. PROBS. 66, 73 (Summe- 1980). Van Alstyne saw the Supreme Court's
grant of certiorari in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980),
as a further indication of the "recrudescence of libertarian thought that identifies
liberty with private property, liberty with prerogatives of property-to exclude from
it, to contract with reference to it, to identify it as part of oneself."
123 Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not limited to "personal" rights, as opposed to "property"
rights).
124 Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (school's communication
of its belief in segregation is protected, but admission of black students will not
impede that communication).
125 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (time, place,
and manner regulations dictated by nature and normal use of property).
126 Cf. Van Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitu-
tional Considerations, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 328, 338-40 (1963) ('It would be ex-
tremely farfetched to assert that a university's educational purpose is totally circum-
scribed by its curriculum, so that even invited speakers do not contribute to its
primary function."); Note, Campus Pamphleteering: The Emerging Constitutional
Standards, 5 J.L. REF. 109, 112 (1971) (a university is justified in "exclud[ing]
some areas from the public forum category").
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commercial transactions or political canvassing in university dormi-
tories,127 or perhaps by excluding commercial activity altogether.
28
In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court formulated
a test to determine when the state constitution allows free speech
rights to be enforced on private property. The test considers
three factors:
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private
property, generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and
nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and
(3) the purpose of the expressional activity undertaken
upon such property in relation to both the private and
public use of the property.129
The court concluded that Princeton had invited the public to use
its facilities and that Schmid's activities were "not incompatible with
either Princeton University's professed educational goals or the
University's overall use of its property for educational purposes." 130
Thus, the court held, Schmid had a right to speak on Princeton's
campus, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions.1' 1
The Schmid opinion contemplates substantial deference to uni-
versity discretion in assessing the reasonableness of its time, place,
and manner rules, out of regard for universities' "paramount role
as vehicles of education and enlightenment." 132 The court found,
however, that the university regulations applied to Schmid were
unreasonable because they "contained no standards, aside from the
requirement for invitation and permission, for governing the actual
exercise of expressional freedom." 183
'27 See American Future Systems, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d
252, 257-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (transaction of sales with groups of students in dormi-
tories may constitutionally be banned); Brush v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 489 Pa.
243, 414 A.2d 48 (1980) (regulation of political canvassing in residence halls is
constitutional).
128 Although Schmid was selling as well as distributing his materials, his pri-
mary activity apparently was political rather than commercial.
129 84 N.J. at 563, 423 A.2d at 630.
130 Id. at 565, 423 A.2d at 631 (footnote omitted).
131 See id. at 567-68, 423 A.2d at 632-33.
132 Id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632. In dictum, the court even approved the revised
regulations Princeton voluntarily instituted after Schmid's arrest. Id. at 539 n.2,
568, 423 A.2d at 617 n.2, 633. See supra note 9.
'33 Id. at 567, 423 A.2d at 632. The New Jersey Supreme Court made no
reference to any first amendment rights on Princeton's part but did state:
Private educational institutions perform an essential social function and
have a fundamental responsibility to assure the academic and general well-
being of their communities of students, teachers and related personnel. At
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If the court's test is read to require an examination only into
the possibility of disruption of university activities, 8 4 it would
appear adequate to protect Princeton's legitimate concerns. The
court, however, did not ask merely whether Schmid's activity was
compatible with use of the property for educational purposes-
that is, whether it would interfere with the university's normal
functions. 18 5 It also examined the compatibility of Schmid's ac-
tivity with Princeton's particular educational philosophy. 3 6 The
court probably was pleased to find in Princeton's own regulations
a ringing endorsement of the values of free speech and the exposure
of students and faculty to a wide range of views.137 It may seem
only logical for the court to have engaged in such an inquiry. In
basing its decision on the content of Princeton's philosophy and its
compatibility with Schmid's speech, however, the court was in fact
infringing on the federal constitutional rights of both parties. 38
It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that legislation
or judicial action that is so vague as to have a chilling effect on
protected speech violates the first amendment. 3 9 Under the Schmid
test, a university cannot be sure whether its particular philosophy
-which is speech protected by the first amendment-will be deemed
"compatible" with particular kinds of expressive activity. Even a
standard that looks to compatibility between speech and an area's
a minimum, these needs, implicating academic freedom and development,
justify an educational institution in controlling those who seek to enter its
domain.
84 NJ. at 566, 423 A.2d at 632. Apparently, under the court's holding, considera-
tions of institutional autonomy and "academic freedom" are relevant only to the
reasonableness of time, place, and manner regulations.
134 Cf. id. at 565-66, 423 A.2d at 631 (no indication that Schmid's activities
disrupted the University's essential operations).
'35 Id. at 564-66, 423 A.2d at 631. Courts commonly look at the purpose of
a particular area--even a publicly owned area-when deciding whether expressive
activity may be barred. See, e.g., Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968). One commentator has suggested,
however, that the correct test in the educational setting is not the "primary purpose"
of an area, but whether the proposed use will "intolerably burden the school's
facilities." Van Alstyne, supra note 126, at 339 (footnote omitted).
136 84 N.J. at 564-66, 423 A.2d at 630-31.
137The university's statement of its educational goals declares in part: "Free
Speech and peaceable assembly are basic requirements of the University as a center
for free inquiry and the search for knowledge and insight." Id. at 564, 423 A.2d
at 630.
138 The third part of the New Jersey court's test, see supra text accompanying
note 129, might be read to require a content-based distinction-that is, a person
distributing leaflets espousing an "anti-education" viewpoint might be barred because
his or her speech was incompatible with the educational use of the property. This
interpretation would, like the court's application of the test, pose serious problems
of content neutrality. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45.
'39 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967).
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"normal use" or "purpose" is vague; 140 a compatibility standard
based on an institution's educational philosophy may be unconsti-
tutionally vague.141
Moreover, the court, rather than Princeton, is making the
compatibility judgment. This judicial involvement may infringe
on the equal protection rights of the person distributing leaflets.
When a speaker's first amendment rights are involved, courts and
other governmental bodies are prohibited from making distinctions
on the basis of the content of speech.14 When private property
has been "opened" to public speech under a finding of state action,
similar restrictions have been placed on the property owner.
143
Because the New Jersey court did not find state action on Prince-
ton's part,144 Schmid's first amendment rights are not at issue. Never-
theless, any denial of a state-created right-which would have
occurred if Schmid's speech had been suppressed because of "in-
compatibility"-brings into play the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has held that when a
state denies a right of speech on the basis of the speech's content,
equal protection scrutiny is exacting: "When government regula-
tion discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum,
the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely
tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications
offered for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized." 145
140 See Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by
Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALw. L. REv. 132, 169 n.158 (1966)
(standard of compatibility of speech with educational objectives of university too
vague).
141 See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603-04; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963) (precision of regulation especially important in first amendment area).
142See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
143 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501, 506-09 (1946).
In Hudgens, the Court relied on the prohibition against content-based regula-
tion to demonstrate that its decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972),
had actually overruled Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518. See supra note 27.
In Logan Valley, the Court allowed picketing of a store in a shopping center. In
Lloyd, the Court refused to allow distribution of antiwar leaflets in a shopping
center, distinguishing Logan Valley on the grounds that the content of the expressive
activity in that case was related to the shopping center's operations. 407 U.S. at
562. In Hudgens, the Court noted that if a shopping center is deemed the "func-
tional equivalent of a municipality," the Constitution does not permit content-based
control of speech. 424 U.S. at 520.
144 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text
145 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980). See Police Dep't of Chicago
v, Mosley; 408 U.S. 92, 98-99, 101 (1972).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court could have avoided these con-
stitutional difficulties by excluding the third part of its test.140 The
California Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center
relied on such a content-neutral test: the extent to which the prop-
erty has been opened to public use and the extent to which the
expressive activity will interfere with the normal use of the prop-
erty.147 Because a university's first amendment rights of academic
freedom do not extend to its property' 48 the test to be applied
should be the same as that which would apply to any property
owner. "Educational philosophy" should not be a consideration.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS OF A NONCOMMERCIAL
PROPERTY OWNER
Although a university does not have special first amendment
rights in the use of its property, its constitutional interests as a non-
commercial property owner are not necessarily identical to those of
a shopping center owner. The shopping center owner in Prune-
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins advanced two lines of defense,
one based on his property rights and the other on his individual
first amendment rights. 149 His property claims were that the state
court's decision was a taking of property without just compensation
and a deprivation of property without due process of law.150 His
first amendment claim was based on the theory that "a private prop-
erty owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by the
State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others." 151
A. The Property Arguments
The Supreme Court, in rejecting the property claims, spoke
solely in terms of commercial property. When noncommercial
property is involved, as in Princeton University v. Schmid, 52 a
different rule may prevail.
In PruneYard, for example, the Court found that requiring
public speech in a shopping center was not a taking without just
146 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147 23 Cal. 3d 899, 905, 909-10, 592 P.2d 341, 344, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854,
857, 860 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
148 See supra text following notes 119 & 123 and text accompanying notes
120-23.
149 447 U.S. 74, 80-88 (1980).
150 Id. 82-85.
151 Id. 85 (footnote omitted).
15250 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576), dismissing appeal
from State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
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compensation: the shopping center's owners had failed to show
that the " 'right to exclude others' " was "essential to the use or
economic value of [the] property ... .". 10 Commercial property
owners derive economic benefits from opening their property to
the public; imposing public obligations on them in exchange for
these benefits is perhaps justifiable. On the other hand, because
universities are noncommercial and ostensibly devoted to study
and research, unrestricted access by outsiders may cause a significant
reduction in university property value. In light of such a reduc-
tion, a court might find a taking without just compensation. Thus,
noncommercial property owners may be granted greater protec-
tion.154
An argument may well exist, however, for affording more pro-
tection to commercial than to noncommercial owners. Noncom-
mercial owners who do not wish to host expressive activity may
simply close their property to the public. But this may not be a
viable option for most commercial property owners. In addition,
some noncommercial properties, including some university cam-
puses, may be better suited to dedication as "public forums" than
some shopping centers. The location and landscaping of a campus
may make it a natural gathering place for speakers and listeners.
Under this line of reasoning, a university's property rights chal-
lenge would fail. A claim such as Princeton's would not be suf-
ficient to prevent the state from interfering on behalf of an indi-
vidual speaker.
B. The First Amendment Claim
The Court's discussion of the shopping center owner's first
amendment rights in PruneYard has been identified as more prob-
lematic than its discussion of his property rights.155 The Court
rejected the claim that a private property owner has a first amend-
ment right not to be forced by the state to use his property for the
speech of others. 56 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, ex-
153 447 U.S. at 84. The due process test the Court applied requires that the
governmental action not be "'unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"' and that there
be a "real and substantial relation" between that action and a legitimate state
interest. Id. 84-85 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523, 525 (1934)).
This test would seem to apply equally to universities and shopping centers because
the ends (promoting free speech) and the means (opening private property to
public speech) are the same in both instances.
154 This argument might apply equally, if not with greater force, to such private
nonprofit institutions as museums and art galleries.
155 See, e.g., Comment, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 9 HoFsmA
L. REv. 289, 307-08 (1980).
156 447 U.S. at 85-88.
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pressed serious reservations about the breadth of this holding.157
He stressed that the holding should be limited to the large suburban
shopping center actually involved in the case and noted that "[s]ig-
nificantly different questions would be presented if a State authorized
strangers to picket or distribute leaflets in privately owned, free-
standing stores and commercial premises." 15s
Justice Powell identified two potential problems. First, if the
establishment were smaller, patrons might assume that the owner
shared the views expressed by strangers. Second, apparently regard-
less of the establishment's size, the owner might find the views
expressed so repugnant that he or she would feel compelled to re-
spond1 59 The Constitution, Justice Powell noted, protects an
individual's "'right to refrain from speaking at all.' "160
Assuming that a university can assert first amendment rights
similar to those of an individual property owner, Justice Powell's
concerns may be applied to the Schmid case. His first concern is
unlikely to create problems on a large university campus. Strollers
on Princeton's campus probably would not assume that the univer-
sity had lent its official support to the United States Labor Party
simply because of Schmid's distribution of leaflets on campus. On
a smaller campus, however, the possibility of such confusion is some-
what more likely. Nevertheless, the primary targets of expressive
activity on any campus are bound to be the students, who are
likely to be familiar with the administration's official views.
A more serious problem may be the possibility of repugnant
ideas. Should a predominantly black university, for example, be
required to allow the Ku Klux Klan to hand out leaflets? 11 If it
permits outside groups to use its auditorium, should it be required
157 Id. 96-101 (Powell, J., joined by White, J., concurring in part and n the
judgment).
158 Id. 96.
159 Id. 99-100.
100Id. 99 (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). Justice
Powell also said that the Constitution protects the "'freedom to maintain [one's]
own beliefs without public disclosure."' 447 U.S. at 100 (quoting Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977)).
161 Cf. 447 U.S. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring):
A minority-owned business confronted with leafleteers from the American
Nazi Party or the Ku Klux Klan, a church-operated enterprise asked to
host demonstrations in favor of abortion, or a union compelled to supply
a forum to right-to-work advocates could be placed in an intolerable posi-
tion if state law requires it to make its private property available to
anyone who wishes to speak.
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to rent available space for a Klan rally? 16 Results such as these
obviously would be disturbing, but once the state becomes involved
in the decisionmaking process, questions of repugnance should not
be allowed to determine the outcome. 163 Any judicial test that
relied on incompatibility between a property owner's views and
those of an outside speaker would suffer from constitutional de-
fects similar to those of the test applied in State v. Schmid. 164 A
court might, however, find that the property has not been opened
to public use. Alternatively, a court might focus on the size of an
establishment, imposing a "public forum" status only on large
blocks of private property.165 Once a court has found private
property to be a public forum, only two constitutional approaches
would seem to be open to it. First, the court could find the speech
to be incompatible with the use of the property.166 Second, it could
punish the speaker if it found the speech posed a "clear and present
danger." 167
Hence, both arguments advanced by the property owner in
PruneYard also would fail in a case involving noncommercial prop-
erty. Whether commercial property, such as a shopping center, or
noncommercial property, such as a university campus, is involved,
the PruneYard rationale may prevail.
V. CONCLUSION
States should be able to require private universities that have
opened their property to public use to host expressive activity by
strangers without violating the universities' constitutionally pro-
tected free speech or property rights. Moreover, absent state in-
162 In the auditorium situation, the public at large is perhaps more likely to
mistake the views of an outside group for those of the university. n addition,
the renting of an auditorium appears to cross the line between passivity and activity,
and the school might argue that its decisions to whom it will rent constitute pro-
tected speech. But see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975) (denial of municipal facilities held to be a prior restraint).
163 See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
164 Id.
165 Perhaps the only way to accommodate Justice Powell's concerns is to focus
solely on the size of the establishment. Thus a black shopping center owner could
not exclude the Klan, no matter how repugnant he found its views, but a black
storeowner might. See generally Cohen, supra note 35, at 392-93.
166 See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966) (peaceful demon-
stration on grounds of jail not protected by first amendment); Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (silent protest in library permissible because not disrup-
tive of library's activities).
167 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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terference with its core educational decisions, a university cannot
rely on the constitutional doctrine of academic freedom to exclude
strangers from its campus. In light of these conclusions, argu-
ments such as those Princeton advanced in Princeton University v.
Schmid 11s are likely to fail.
Policy considerations, however, may lead the states to be cau-
tious in enforcing speech rights on university property. The pros-
pect of universities declaring their campuses off-limits to the public
in order to exclude undesirable expression, while perhaps unlikely,
is not particularly appealing. Moreover, the incentives to open
other kinds of private property to public expression may not apply
so strongly to universities. Shopping centers, for example, have
been seen as appropriate areas for public speech because they have
replaced downtown business districts in many parts of the country.
Some suburban shopping malls now include not only retail stores
but also meeting rooms, churches, post offices, and law offices,
leading one observer to compare the modern shopping center to
the traditional village green.169 Access to shopping centers may be
crucial in reaching large groups of people efficiently and inexpen-
sively.170
Universities have not taken the place of traditional public
forums in recent years. On the other hand, the number of public
forums need not be fixed permanently by tradition. A state's inter-
est in promoting free speech may justify its adding to, rather than
merely preserving, areas where the public has a right to speak.
16850 U.S.L.W. 4159 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 80-1576), dismissing appeal
from State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
169 Comment, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 9 HoFsTRA L. REv. 289,
310 (1980).
170 The California Supreme Court cited statistics on the "growing importance
of the shopping center" in Robins v. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907, 592 P.2d 341,
345, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 858 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). But see Cohen,
supra note 35, at 395, arguing that today it is not so important that shopping centers
be open to public speech because new "public forums"-such as broadcast stations-
have arisen.
A similar argument may be made regarding privately owned real estate develop-
ments and mobile home parks. See, e.g., Private Abridgment, supra note 35, at
168-71. The case for opening private property to public access is perhaps strongest
when relatively helpless or immobile populations, such as the elderly or migrant
laborers, are involved. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 307, 277 A.2d 369,
374 (1971) (finding, under state constitution, a right of access to migrant labor
camps by government agency workers, charitable groups, visitors of workers' choice,
and members of press). Often those seeking a right of access are activists or union
organizers whose purpose is to prevent the exploitation of an isolated group by the
property owner. See generally Note, Access to Migrant Labor Camps: Marsh v.
Alabama Revisited, 55 CHm.-KENT L. Ruv. 285 (1979); Note, Listeners' Rights
Providing a State Action Theory in the "Company Town" Analogues, 55 IND. L.J.
91 (1979).
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In addition, some universities are sufficiently self-contained that
their students rarely leave the campus. 171 Those students who are
over the age of eighteen are also voters, and the state has a legitimate
interest in insuring that they have easy access to voting informa-
tion.'7
Undoubtedly, the factors to be balanced against these interests
are different in the case of a university from those involved in the
case of a shopping center. Nevertheless, states have broad, well-
established authority to regulate private property in the exercise
of their police power, so long as they do not contravene any consti-
tutional provision.1 3  The balance between the nonconstitutional
interests of educational institutions and the nonconstitutional free
speech rights of individual citizens is one that should be left to the
individual states. Experimentation by the states in this relatively
uncharted area may well lead to significantly greater rights of
speech and assembly for their citizens, without any measureable
harmful effect on their colleges and universities.
171 Among the on-campus facilities at Princeton are laundry rooms, a university
newspaper, a "pub," several theaters, and an art museum. Jurisdictional Statement,
supra note 17, at 55a-57a.
172 Approximately 87% of the Princeton student body is eligible to vote. Id.
54a. Schmid's leaflets concerned an upcoming Newark mayoralty election.
'
73 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
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